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Parkinson’s disease (PD) impairs the control of movement and cognition, including the
planning of action and its consequences. This provides the opportunity to study the
dopaminergic influences on the perception and awareness of action. Here we examined
the perception of the outcome of a goal-directed action made by medicated patients
with PD. A visuomotor task probed the integration of sensorimotor signals with the
positive expectations of outcomes (Self priors), which in healthy adults bias perception
toward success in proportion to trait optimism. We tested the hypotheses that (i) the
priors on the perception of the consequences of one’s own actions differ between
patients and age- and sex-matched controls, and (ii) that these priors are modulated
by the levodopa dose equivalent (LDEs) in patients. There was no overall difference
between patients and controls in the perceptual priors used. However, the precision
of patient priors was inversely related to their LDE. Patients with high LDE showed
more accurate priors, representing predictions that were closer to the true distribution
of performance. Such accuracy has previously been demonstrated when observing the
actions of others, suggesting abnormal awareness of action in these patients. These
results confirm a link between dopamine and the positive expectation of the outcome of
one’s own actions, and may have implications for the management of PD.
Keywords: positive expectation, voluntary action, agency, Parkinson’s disease, dopamine, Bayesian, placebo,
inverted U-shaped function
Introduction
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a common neurodegenerative disease, associated with the loss of
dopaminergic projections from the substantia nigra and ventral tegmentum to the striatum and
frontal cortex respectively (reviewed in Cools, 2006). PD causes a disorder of movement with
tremor, rigidity, and bradykinesia (Hughes et al., 1992). However, it also aﬀects motor cognition,
including executive function such as planning, sequencing and initiating movements (Owen et al.,
1992; Williams-Gray et al., 2007a; Hughes et al., 2010, 2013). Dopamine replacement therapies
alleviate some of these cognitive functions and their underlying neural circuits, but impair others
(Gotham et al., 1988; Kehagia et al., 2010; Rowe et al., 2010).
Parkinson’s disease can also change the perception and awareness of voluntary action. For
example, the perception of the position and motion of one’s own body parts, known as
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‘kinaesthesia,’ is impaired by PD (Klockgether et al., 1995),
possibly due to an abnormal processing of sensory feedback
(Konczak et al., 2012). Levodopa alleviates kinaesthetic deﬁcits
in some studies (Li et al., 2010), but not in others (O’Suilleabhain
et al., 2001).
The eﬀect of PD on the perception of self-generated
actions was also assessed by the intentional binding paradigm.
Intentional binding refers to the perceived temporal attraction
between a voluntary action and its sensory eﬀect in instrumental
behavior (Haggard et al., 2002). It has been used as an objective
measure for the awareness of action and sense of agency (Wolpe
and Rowe, 2014). This temporal attraction is unchanged in PD
patients, but is enhanced by levodopa (Moore et al., 2010).
Together, these inconsistent results demonstrate a complex
eﬀect of PD and levodopa on the awareness of action, which
might reﬂect a change in the expectations of outcomes rather
than changes in sensation per se. We therefore studied the eﬀect
of PD and levodopa on the positive expectations of the outcome
of goal-directed actions.
We recently reported that people’s perception of the outcome
of their own goal-directed action is normally biased toward
goal success (Wolpe et al., 2014). The bias can be explained by
optimistic Bayesian Self priors – that is, the exaggerated reliability
of expectations of success set by the goal of the action, and
integrated with the sensorimotor signals for perception. The
priors are optimistic in the sense that they have a narrower
distribution around the intended goal, relative to the actual
distribution of performance. In contrast, for observed actions
people use priors that more accurately represents the observed
performance (Wolpe et al., 2014).
Optimistic expectations are normally integrated with
sensorimotor signals that contribute to the awareness of action
(Frith et al., 2000). For example, a cognitive process can
‘exaggerate’ the reliability of low-level sensorimotor prediction
signals, such as the eﬀerence copy of the motor command
(Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000). The integration leads to
narrow Self priors that support the correct attribution of actions
by facilitating the diﬀerence between perception of one’s own and
others’ actions (Wolpe et al., 2014).
Dopamine is a key neuromodulator that signals reward
expectation in the striatum during operant action-reward
conditioning (de la Fuente-Fernández et al., 2001). Striatal
dopamine loss might therefore alter the positive expectation
of outcomes of one’s actions. Moreover, the representation of
expected reward in medial frontal cortex is also dependent on
dopamine (Rowe et al., 2008), and liable to hyper-dopaminergic
eﬀects in early PD (Rakshi et al., 1999) as well as dopamine loss
in later stages.
The current study sought to examine the eﬀect of dopamine
on the perception of the outcome of goal-directed action. We
tested the speciﬁc hypotheses that PD and levodopa modulate
the perception of action by changing the exaggeration of expected
performance (optimism). Patients in mild to moderate stages of
PD participated, on their usual medication. We hypothesized that
(i) PD would diminish the positive expectations for goal-directed
actions, represented in reduced reliability of Self priors; and
that (ii) the levodopa dose equivalents (LDE) of dopaminergic
medication would determine the reliability of these priors and
alter the perception of one’s goal-directed actions.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty patients (13 men; aged 48–81 years mean: 68; SD: 10)
were recruited from the John van Geest Centre for Brain Repair,
PD research clinic. Patients met clinical diagnostic criteria of
idiopathic PD, according to the UK PD brain bank criteria
(Hughes et al., 1992), and were mild to moderate stages of
disease, [Hoehn and Yahr stages 1–3] (Hoehn and Yahr, 1967).
In addition, 20 age- and sex-matched, neurologically healthy
controls, (12 men; aged 55–76 years, mean: 68; SD: 6) were
included in the study, and were compensated with £12 for their
participation. All subjects were right-handed, and gave written
informed consent before the experiment. The studywas approved
by the Cambridge Research Ethics Committee.
Assessment of motor and cognitive symptoms in patients was
performed at the beginning of the testing session. The severity of
motor features was assessed with the Uniﬁed Parkinson’s Disease
Rating Scale (UPDRS) motor subscale III (Fahn and Elton,
1987). Cognitive abilities in both patients and controls were
assessed through the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE;
Folstein et al., 1975) and Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination
Revised (ACE-R; Mioshi et al., 2006). Cognitive impairment
was an exclusion criterion: as ACE-R has better sensitivity and
speciﬁcity for cognitive impairment in PD than MMSE (Reyes
et al., 2009), we used the ACE-R cut-oﬀ score of 83/100 (Reyes
et al., 2009).
All patients were on dopamine replacement therapy at the
time of the experiment: patients were tested in the morning after
taking their morning medication as normal. The time interval
between levodopa self administration and testing varied between
1 and 3 h, such that patients were in a relative ‘on’ state. Our
patients had mild to moderate PD (see Table 1) and were not
aﬀected by clinically signiﬁcant on-oﬀ phenomena or freezing.
LDE was computed according to Tomlinson et al. (2010).
Self Prior Task and Procedure
Subjects performed a modiﬁed version of the Self Stop task
described inWolpe et al. (2014) (Figure 1A). Subjects were seated
0.5 m from a 17′ Protouch LCD touch screen with 1024 × 768
resolution (26 pixels/cm) that refreshed at 60 Hz. All stimuli were
displayed with Matlab Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997).
In brief, subjects were asked to stop a blue ball (15 pixel radius),
which repeatedly swept the screen horizontally in a rightward
motion. When it was vertically aligned with a red circle target
(15 pixel radius), subjects pressed a key with their right index
ﬁnger to stop the ball. The ball vanished following the key
press, and 250 ms later the target disappeared. The ball’s starting
position was randomized across trials (drawn from a uniform
distribution covering the horizontal extent of the screen). The
target was horizontally centered, and was displayed close to
the top of the screen, just above the sweeping blue ball. The
number of ball sweeps was limited to three, in order to control
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TABLE 1 | Demographic details of Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients participating in the study.
No. Gender
(M/F)
Age Disease duration
(years)
Disease stage∗
(0-5)
UPDRS-III motor
subscale (0-56)
MMSE
(0-30)
ACE-R
(0-100)
LDE ∗∗
1 M 74 16 2 20 30 98 620
2 F 76 10 2 26 29 91 560
3 M 81 15 2.5 13 29 94 410
4 M 54 15 1 13 29 89 1817
4 F 73 13 2.5 16 28 95 565
6 F 76 9 3 37 30 91 855
7 F 81 13 2 15 29 97 1355
8 M 77 13 2 24 30 97 1722
9 M 64 6 1.5 21 29 94 1175
10 M 48 6 2.5 16 29 88 536
11 M 72 26 1 21 28 85 460
12 M 69 10 1 21 23 84 276
13 M 57 14 1 31 28 94 1180
14 F 66 17 2 19 27 95 1740
15 M 76 12 1 18 27 87 1500
16 F 64 11 3 16 28 96 1000
17 M 77 9 3 19 27 88 700
18 F 55 8 2 20 29 98 200
19 M 56 11 3 14 29 86 1210
20 M 63 11 1.5 16 29 94 1315
Mean 68 12 2 20 28 92 960
UPDRS, Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale; MMSE, Mini-Mental State Examination; ACE-R, Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination Revised; LDE, Levodopa Dose
Equivalent; ∗According to Hoehn and Yahr (1967); ∗∗Calculated according to Tomlinson et al. (2010).
for stopping times across groups, thereby minimizing potential
group diﬀerences in task demands. When failing to respond after
three sweeps, the trial was stopped, and before it was restarted
subjects received a message on the screen prompting them to
respond faster.
Subjects were asked to point with their left index ﬁnger on
the screen where the ball had stopped (i.e., ﬁnal position before
vanishing). Screen pointing was used after a pilot experiment
showed that it was preferable to using a mouse for many patients.
The left hand was chosen to facilitate fast responses, as the right
hand remained resting on the key in preparation for the next trial.
The spatial shift in pointing due to hand use was corrected in the
analysis by including an additional spatial shift parameter (see
Analyses).
Subjects were also given the option to skip the trial during the
estimation of the stopping point, by pointing at the word ‘Skip’
displayed at the bottom of the screen. Any trial that was skipped
was excluded, and an additional trial was added instead, so that
all subjects’ dataset had an equal number of trials (on average
four trials skipped per subject). The experiment was performed
FIGURE 1 | Modified ‘Stop’ task performed in the study. (A) An illustration of the modified Self Stop task (Wolpe et al., 2014). Subjects watched a blue ball that
repeatedly swept horizontally across the screen in a rightward motion. They were asked to press a key with their right hand, so as to stop the ball when it was
vertically aligned with a red target. Following the stopping event, subjects estimated where they had stopped the ball, by pointing on the screen with their left index
finger. For each trial, we examined their performance error (difference between the actual stopping position and the target position) and estimation error (difference
between the pointing position and the actual stopping position). (B) Estimation errors plotted against performance errors for a typical subject (here a control subject).
The dashed line indicates a linear regression fit, and the error bars indicate SD. Note the leftward shift in the intercept of the regression line, which was accounted for
in the Bayesian model fitting.
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in blocks of trials. The experiment started with a short practice
block of 12 trials to familiarize subjects with the task. Following
practice, two blocks of 52 trials each were performed.
Analyses
As in Wolpe et al. (2014), for each trial we calculated the
estimation error (distance between estimated stopping position
and true stopping position) and the performance error (distance
between true stopping position and target). For each subject,
we ﬁrst ﬁtted a linear regression of estimation errors against
performance errors to examine any bias in estimation. In order to
have a consistency in the estimation procedure and to minimize
a possible interference from diﬀerent memory processes, we
excluded outlier trials with longer estimation times in the
following manner: trials with estimation times greater than 2 SDs
from the mean were excluded (on average one trial for each
control and four trials for each patient). One additional patient
was excluded from the study cohort, as his mean estimation time
was larger than 3 SDs from the patient group mean.
We inferred the subjects’ priors by ﬁtting Bayesian models
through maximum likelihood estimation – that is, maximizing
the probability of each subject’s dataset. We used a constrained
model, in which the mean of priors was centered on the target,
and the mean of sensory evidence was centered on the true
stopping position. However, as subjects used their left hand to
estimate the stopping position, we expected there would be a
consistent spatial (left) shift in estimates that should be accounted
for in the model.
Such a spatial shift might be incorporated in the prior mean,
in the visual evidence mean or in both. In the non-linear model
ﬁtting of the maximum likelihood estimation process, a model
with a shift in the prior mean; a model with a shift in sensory
evidencemean; and amodel with a shift in both prior and sensory
evidence, are all mathematically equivalent and will converge on
the same parameters. However, a model that includes a shift in
both prior and sensory evidence has an additional free parameter
compared to only a shift in either. Moreover, we expected the
spatial shift to arise due to the screen pointing process and
independent of the prior. We therefore used a model with a
shift in evidence mean (which in this experiment includes both
sensory noise and noise added during the screen pointing) in
addition to the constrained model above. We used the following
equation derived in Wolpe et al. (2014):
xestimate = w ∗ xprior + (1 − w) ∗ (xevidence + shiftevidence)
with x prior centered on the target, and the weighting w given by:
w = σ
2
evidence
σ2prior + σ2evidence
(Ghahramaniet al., 1997).
To summarize, we ﬁtted the following models:
1) Constrained model, with only prior SD and visual evidence
SD as free parameters (2 parameters).
2) Prior SD and visual evidence SD as well as a spatial shift in
visual evidence (3 parameters).
The model that best explained the data was selected using
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) with a threshold
diﬀerence of 6 for ‘strong’ evidence (Schwarz, 1978; Raftery,
1995). Only parameters of the winning models were presented.
For correlations with the clinical data and age, non-parametric
Spearman’s correlations were performed.
Results
The clinical details of patients are summarized in Table 1.
Patients had a mixed severity of motor features and duration of
illness, but they were all in mild to moderate stages of disease
(Hoehn and Yahr, 1967).
Patients and controls were all able to perform the modiﬁed
‘Stop’ task (Figure 1A). Our ﬁrst objective was to examine the
diﬀerence in the perception of the consequences of one’s own
goal-directed actions between PD patients and controls. To this
end, we compared the perceptual bias toward the target measured
in the regression slopes, followed by a comparison of the Bayesian
model parameters.
Before examining the perceptual bias and priors, we ﬁrst
compared the time it took subjects to complete the task as a
possible confound. Patients and controls did not diﬀer in the time
required for stopping the ball (t38 = −0.69, p= 0.49). In contrast,
there was a group diﬀerence in the time to estimate the ball
stopping position (t38 = 2.09, p = 0.043). Mean Estimation time
in patients was 1.07 s, but only 0.88 s in controls. We therefore
included mean estimation times as a nuisance covariate in both
the between-group and within-group analyses of the Bayesian
priors below.
Perceptual Biases Toward the Target Across
Groups
We examined subjects’ bias toward the target, by ﬁtting a linear
regression of estimation errors against performance errors for
each subject (Figure 1B). Mean intercept (i.e., ball stopping
position) in patients was just six pixels left of the target, and
15 pixels left of the target in controls (see below). Estimation
errors were always biased in a graded manner, as measured
by a negative regression slope, for both patients (slope smaller
than zero in patients: t19 = −9.83, p < 0.001) and controls
(t19 = −8.16, p < 0.001). The extent of the bias, in terms of the
regression slope, was not diﬀerent between patients and controls
(t38 = −1.277, p = 0.419; Bonferroni corrected).
Comparison of Bayesian Model Parameters
Across Groups
We next ﬁtted the data with two Bayesian models: (1) a model
with SDs of sensory evidence and prior, constrained with the
prior centered on the target and the evidence centered on the true
stopping position; (2) a model with SDs of evidence and prior,
and a spatial shift on evidence, likely to arise due to the estimation
procedure of using the left hand (see Figure 1B). On a group-
level, average diﬀerence in BIC was only 1.4 in favor of model 2.
However, on an individual-subject level, model 2 was more likely
than model 1 in 29/40 subjects (BIC diﬀerence greater than 6 in
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12/20 patients and 17/20 controls), which was signiﬁcant by a sign
test (two-tailed; p = 0.006). We therefore report the parameters
of model 2.
Examining the model parameter of shift from stopping
position in the distribution of sensory evidence, subjects had a
consistent leftward shift on their sensory evidence (t38 = −4.8,
p < 0.001). This shift is likely to have resulted from using the
left hand during the screen pointing procedure. Importantly,
the shift did not diﬀer across groups (mean shift in patients:
18 pixels; mean shift in controls: 23 pixels; t38 = 0.95, p = 0.35;
uncorrected).
Examining the distribution of sensory evidence, there was a
signiﬁcant increase in the SDs of sensory evidence in patients
compared to controls (t38 = 3.14, p = 0.003). This increase
in patients could reﬂect an elevated sensory noise, or more
noise attributed to the estimation procedure. Our main focus
in this study, however, was on the diﬀerences in priors between
patients and controls and within the patient group with relation
to levodopa.
The SDs of priors correlated with performance error SDs for
both patients (r = 0.706, p < 0.001) and controls (r = 0.582,
p = 0.007) (Figure 2A), as in Wolpe et al. (2014). Based on
this strong correlation, and as patient performance error SD
was greater than that in controls (t38 = 2.33, p = 0.025), we
examined priors with their values normalized to performance
distribution (Figure 2B). These normalized priors reﬂect the
degree of exaggeration of positive expectations for each subject.
SDs of priors for both patients and controls were signiﬁcantly
smaller than SDs of performance distribution (normalized values
smaller than 0.5 for patients: t19 = −5.92, p< 0.001; and controls:
t19 = −4.482, p < 0.001). These results replicate the exaggerated
Self priors found in Wolpe et al. (2014).
As patients and controls showed a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
estimation time (see above), we included estimation time as a
nuisance covariate in the comparison across groups in an analysis
of covariance. Normalized priors did not diﬀer across groups
(Figure 2B), with very small eﬀect sizes: there was neither a
main eﬀect of group [F(1,36) = 0.063, p = 0.803, η2 = 0.002],
or estimation time [F(1,36) = 0.081, p = 0.777, η2 = 0.002],
nor a group × estimation time interaction [F(1,36) = 0.12,
p = 0.731, η2 = 0.003]. An additional exploratory analysis
showed no correlation between prior width and disease severity
as measured by UPDRS motor subscale (Spearman’s ρ = −0.01,
ns). Together, these results suggest that PD patients demonstrated
a normal group-average prior despite the likelihood of individual
diﬀerences in disease and treatment. We next explored the source
of within-patient variability, by examining the relation between
priors and LDE.
Relation between Priors and Levodopa
The second objective of our study was to examine the relationship
between the degree of exaggeration in priors and its relationship
to levodopa doses in PD patients. Speciﬁcally, we examined the
relation between individual diﬀerences in Self priors and LDEs
(Figure 3). We found a strong correlation between normalized
prior SDs and LDEs (Spearman’s ρ = 0.723, p = 0.002), arising
from a signiﬁcant correlation between prior SDs and LDEs across
patients (Spearman’s ρ = 0.585, p = 0.039). The correlation was
positive, indicating that patients with higher LDE had wider
priors.
The correlation between normalized priors and LDEs
remained signiﬁcant even after accounting for disease duration
(partial correlation; Spearman’s ρ = 0.723, p = 0.002); severity
of motor features measured using the UPDRS motor subscale III
(partial correlation; Spearman’s ρ = 0.76, p < 0.001); or subject
mean estimation time (partial correlation; Spearman’s ρ = 0.746,
p = 0.001; with Bonferroni correction). For completeness,
we note that there was no consistent relation between the
SDs of sensory evidence and LDEs (Spearman’s ρ = 0.32,
p = 0.17). Taken together, these results suggest that the extent
FIGURE 2 | Comparison between Self priors across groups. (A) SDs of Self priors plotted against SDs of performance errors for patients (blue circles and
regression line) and controls (orange circles and regression line). Data points lie below the line of equality (black dashed line) in 34 of the 40 subjects. (B) Prior SDs
normalized to performance error SDs, plotted for patients (blue) and controls (orange). For both groups, the SDs of priors were smaller than the SDs of performance
errors. No difference was found across groups. Significance level indicated by ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 3 | Self priors versus levodopa dose equivalent in patients
with Parkinson’s disease (PD). Normalized Self priors plotted against
levodopa dose equivalents in patients (blue circles). The blue line indicates a
linear regression for illustration purposes. Controls’ data are plotted for
reference (orange circle and error bars, indicating control group mean and
standard error of the mean, respectively).
of exaggeration of the reliability of Self priors in patients was
strongly related to levodopa doses.
The correlation between the extent of exaggeration of Self
priors and levodopa in patients suggests that patients on higher
levodopa had priors that were closer to the true performance
distribution. However, the ‘accuracy’ of priors is not linearly
related to the values of normalized priors, which can vary
between 0 and 1, but would be 0.5 in the case when priors
and performance error SDs are equal. To formally test how the
accuracy of priors is related to levodopa, we therefore correlated
the absolute diﬀerence between normalized priors and 0.5
with levodopa doses. A strongly signiﬁcant negative correlation
emerged (Spearman’s ρ = −0.717, p = 0.001; Bonferroni
corrected). This negative relation suggests that patients with
high levodopa doses used priors that deviated less from the
distribution of performance, and were thus more accurate,
similar to the perception of observed actions (Wolpe et al., 2014).
Discussion
The principal results of this study are that (i) the group-mean
of the positive distortion of perceived outcomes of one’s own
goal-directed action was similar in medicated PD patients and
healthy individuals; but (ii) there is a strong correlation between
dopaminergic dose and the degree of positive exaggeration of
priors in patients. This correlation indicates that patients on
higher levodopa doses more accurately perceive the outcome
of their own actions, in a way that healthy people perceive the
actions of others but not of themselves.
Group Comparison of Self Priors
Although Self priors were related to dopaminergic medication,
there was no overall group diﬀerence. We suggest that this
reﬂects the dynamic eﬀects of disease on basal ganglia function.
For example, in early stages of PD, the dorsal regions of the
basal ganglia that are implicated in habitual actions are most
aﬀected, while ventral regions that are most associated with
goal-directed control are largely preserved (Redgrave et al.,
2010). As a result, goal-directed behaviors gradually replace
or compensate for the impairment of automated movements
based on stimulus-response associations (Redgrave et al., 2010;
Torres et al., 2011). As patients included in our study had mild
to moderate disease (median Hoehn and Yahr stage two), we
suggest that goal-directed actions and their perception remained
relatively intact.
Another feature of abnormal motor control in PD is the
increased reliance of patients on external cues. The signiﬁcance
of this feature is underscored in the common clinical observation
of improved gait and postural stability in PD patients following
sensory cueing (Azulay et al., 2002, 2006). Several studies have
demonstrated the strong inﬂuence of visual feedback on patient
movements (Flash et al., 1992; Klockgether and Dichgans, 1994;
Schettino et al., 2006), which may partially compensate for
kinaesthetic impairments (Azulay et al., 2006). When visual
feedback is occluded, patients tend to be slower and less accurate
than when it is available (Klockgether and Dichgans, 1994;
Schettino et al., 2006).
Our visuomotor task could reinforce the tendency of patients
to over-rely on visual cues. As it disappears just before the
estimation phase of the task, the target potentially provides
patients with a visual cue to help them complete the estimation
task more quickly and accurately. Bias toward the target as a
visual cue for the estimation procedure may oﬀset the diminution
of priors. This behavioral feature of PD is unlikely to account
for the relationship between levodopa and the width of priors, as
levodopa does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the reliance on external cues
for movement (Burleigh-Jacobs et al., 1997). In addition to the
altered integration of visual signals in PD, impaired oculomotor
function (e.g., Shibasaki et al., 1979; Perneczky et al., 2011) could
inﬂuence performance on our task. However, the absence of a
group diﬀerence in our task and the minimal eﬀect of levodopa
on oculomotor function (Corin et al., 1972) suggest that the eﬀect
of oculomotor dysfunction on our principal results is minimal.
Although we have focussed on the degree of exaggeration
of sensorimotor prediction for the perception of action, it is
worth noting that previous studies have suggested preservation
of other sensorimotor prediction signals in PD. For example,
intentional binding, the perceived temporal attraction between a
voluntary action and its sensory eﬀect, is dependent on an intact
sensorimotor prediction (Waszak et al., 2012; Wolpe et al., 2013;
Wolpe and Rowe, 2014), but is unaﬀected in PD (Moore et al.,
2010). Moreover, kinaesthetic deﬁcits in PD have been found to
be driven by abnormal low-level sensory processing, rather than
changes in prediction processes (Konczak et al., 2012). Similarly,
we found increased noise on sensory evidence in patients, which
can be attributed to abnormal processing of sensory input or to a
greater noise in the motor output during the estimation process.
A second potential contributor to the increased sensory noise
shown by patients is the time it took patients to complete
the procedure. On average, patients were 200 ms slower than
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controls in estimating the sensory consequences of their actions,
although they were not slower in their response time for stopping
the ball. This result is perhaps not surprising, considering the
bradykinesia that is characteristic of PD, but simple motor
response times are not necessarily increased in PD and the
additional estimation time may indicate an impairment in the
cognitive decision processes. The estimation of time or temporal
intervals is also aﬀected by PD (Pastor et al., 1992; Buhusi and
Meck, 2005). This might have been expected to inﬂuence the
perception of velocity of the moving ball, or the horizontal
distance traveled during, although neither the simple regression
models nor Bayesian models to estimate the Self priors suggested
a group-wise diﬀerence even when accounting for the diﬀerent
estimation times. However, PD is a heterogeneous disorder and in
the next section we consider the causes of individual diﬀerences
in priors.
A Relation between Self Priors and Levodopa
Dose
The marked individual diﬀerences in our patients (see Figure 3)
is typical of studies of heterogeneous neurodegenerative disorders
like PD. This variation is in part due to individual diﬀerences in
the extent and severity of striatal dopaminergic denervation and
cortical involvement (e.g., Cools, 2006; Rowe et al., 2008). Much
of the variability in our patients’ priors was explained by LDE
(Spearman’s ρ 0.723), which positively correlated with the degree
of exaggeration in priors. Patients with higher levodopa doses
demonstrated more accurate Self priors that are more similar
to the priors used for observing others’ actions (Wolpe et al.,
2014).
We suggest that exogenous dopamine in PD (indexed by
the LDE) is related to positive expectations: patients under
higher levodopa doses do not show the normal exaggeration of
Self priors. However, the eﬀect of dopamine on fronto-striatal
functions in PD is often described as an inverted U-shaped curve,
such that level of baseline dopaminergic function determines
whether dopaminergic medication enhances or impairs cognitive
functions (Rowe et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2012; Hughes et al.,
2013). These baseline levels are in part determined by the
diﬀerences in the integrity of dopaminergic innervation in the
parallel corticostriatal circuits for motor, oculomotor, limbic and
cognitive function. There are also individual diﬀerences due to
polymorphism in the genotype of Catechol O-Methyltransferase
enzyme (Williams-Gray et al., 2007b; Nombela et al., 2014).
In our study, the correlation between the width of Self priors
and LDE was centered on the mean of controls (no group
diﬀerence), conﬁrming that low levodopa doses have the opposite
eﬀect to high doses in PD patients, a result of inverted
U-shape dose-response relationships (Cools and D’Esposito,
2011).
This U-shaped relation suggests that low doses of levodopa
might preserve, or even further enhance the precision of priors,
leading to increased optimistic expectations. It has been shown
that a single administration of levodopa in young healthy adults
can enhance hedonic expectations for future events (Sharot et al.,
2009). Subjects gave higher ratings of prospective ‘happiness’ to
diﬀerent vacation destinations when given levodopa compared
to placebo. The levodopa dose used by Sharot et al. (2009)
was 100 mg, which according to our data might lead to such
narrower priors (see Figure 5.3A) and the related enhancement
in optimism bias. Taken together, these results conﬁrm the dose-
dependent eﬀect of dopaminergic medication on goal priors
and the resulting optimism bias. It also means that levodopa
administration in young healthy adults cannot be equated to
older neurodegenerative patients in which the dopaminergic
systems are severely perturbed at baseline.
As the narrow Self priors might support the normal attribution
of action (Wolpe et al., 2014), these results imply that PD patients
on high levodopa doses have an impaired sense of agency.
Interestingly, levodopa treatment in PD has indirectly been
shown to alter the sense of agency, increasing overall intentional
binding of action and its eﬀect (Moore et al., 2010). Together,
these ﬁndings not only suggest an impaired awareness of action
in medicated PD patients, but also support the application of Self
priors as an objective measure of agency processes (Wolpe and
Rowe, 2014).
The Mechanism of Action of Dopamine on Self
Priors
Both cognitive and sensorimotor processes are required for
generating predictions for the perception of one’s goal-
directed action (Wolpe et al., 2014). For example, there is a
prediction of the ensuing sensory eﬀect from the eﬀerence
copy of the motor command using a forward model; a
process which is optimized by learning the relation between
an action and its sensory eﬀect (Wolpert and Ghahramani,
2000). These predictions might be adjusted according to prior
knowledge about the world, for example the distribution of
one’s motor performance (Körding and Wolpert, 2004). The
reliability of this low-level sensorimotor prediction can be
‘exaggerated’ by top–down cognitive mechanisms, such as
conscious expectations (Sterzer et al., 2008), motivational states
(Balcetis and Dunning, 2006) and the illusions of superiority
(Wolpe et al., 2014).
The role of striatal dopamine in such prediction processes has
been established in health (Pessiglione et al., 2006). In medicated
PD patients, the relation between the degree of exaggeration
measured in Self priors and dopamine could stem from either
the aberrant endogenous dopamine release, or the inﬂux of
exogenous dopamine from the levodopa treatment. We next
discuss these alternative mechanisms.
Dopamine release in the nigrostriatal system in PD has
been linked to the strength of placebo eﬀect – that is, the
clinical improvement following a non-active treatment due to
the positive expectation of beneﬁt (de la Fuente-Fernández et al.,
2001). Increased nigrostriatal damage may lead to diminished
positive expectations, thereby reducing the placebo eﬀect in PD
(de la Fuente-Fernández et al., 2001). This link can also explain
the relation between Self priors and dopamine in our study: as
levodopa doses are tailored for each patient’s motor impairments,
the computed LDEs may, at least in part, be regarded as a
proxy for nigrostriatal integrity. Patients on higher levodopa
doses, suggesting greater nigrostriatal damage, would thus show
impairment in the normal positive expectations reﬂected in
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the narrow Self priors, resulting in a more ‘accurate’ and less
optimistic perception.
However, levodopa therapies can have detrimental eﬀects on
patient cognition (Cools, 2006), due to the uneven distribution
of striatal and cortical dopaminergic pathology in PD. Dorsal
striatum is most aﬀected early, while ventral striatum and
mesocortex are relatively intact in early disease stages (reviewed
in Kish et al., 1988; Kehagia et al., 2010). As patients’ levodopa
doses are usually adjusted according to the motor deﬁcits (closely
related to the dorsal striatum), they can cause a dopaminergic
overdose of the ventral striatum system (Cools, 2006). Areas
connected to the ventral striatum and the mescortical system,
including anterior cingulate and ventromedial cortex, are
hyperdopaminergic in early medicated PD (Rakshi et al., 1999;
Wu et al., 2012). The anterior cingulate and ventromedial
cortex have been implicated in the illusions of superiority
(Beer and Hughes, 2010) and optimism bias (Sharot et al.,
2007), which can be explained in terms of exaggerated Self
priors (Wolpe et al., 2014). In our study, increasing doses of
levodopa could have thus impaired the exaggeration of reliability
of sensorimotor prediction by overdosing the mesocortical
pathway.
Implications for PD
In healthy adults, the degree of exaggeration in Self priors
has been shown to be associated with trait optimism bias:
people who show wider priors tend to be less optimistic
(Wolpe et al., 2014). The exaggerated priors and the related
‘positive’ cognitive illusions could thereby facilitate motivation
and adaptive behavior (Taylor and Brown, 1988). In PD patients,
however, increasing damage to nigrostriatal circuits and/or long-
term dopaminergic overdose of the mesocortex impair the
exaggeration of the reliability of priors, leading to amore accurate
but pessimistic perception of one’s actions. The persistence of
this pessimistic and accurate perception might lead to a reduced
motivation as a result of a ‘depressive realism’ (Alloy and
Abramson, 1988). The abnormally accurate perception of the
consequences of ones actions does not imply accurate choices in
the selection of actions. Indeed, dopaminergic dysregulation in
PD alters value based decision making (Voon et al., 2010), which
predisposes to impulsive and addictive behaviors (Napier et al.,
2014).
A more accurate perception of the outcomes of one’s
actions might put patients at risk for depression and poor
motivation, which are indeed often observed in PD (e.g., Gotham
et al., 1986); and which contribute to the reduced quality
of life in patients (Schrag et al., 2000). Similarly, broadening
of Self priors might reﬂect diminished positive expectations,
including reduced expectation of beneﬁt from treatment (de
la Fuente-Fernández et al., 2001), impairing the alleviation of
symptoms.
The administration of dopamine in PD can elevate mood
and reduce anxiety (Maricle et al., 1995; Czernecki et al.,
2002). Critically, the reported improvement in depressive
symptoms in such studies was the result of a short-term
levodopa administration following overnight withdrawal and
were measured using self-reports and questionnaires (Maricle
et al., 1995; Czernecki et al., 2002). However, the eﬀect of
dopamine on patients withdrawn from chronic dopaminergic
treatment could be due to the alleviation of acute withdrawal
eﬀects, rather than indicating a long-term role in behavior
(Nestler, 2001). In contrast, our study measured sensorimotor
and perceptual processes while the patients were on their usual
medication.
The current study has several limitations. Firstly, we do not
separate our analysis according to the laterality of dominant
motor symptoms. This varied across patients, and could aﬀect
the motor performance on the visuomotor task, and may add
unexplained variability to the correlation analyses. However, in
the absence of a priori hypotheses of lateralised processes, small
numbers and the presence of a systemic therapy, we suggest that
collapsing across the factor of laterality is preferable. In addition
to altered control of the hands which may aﬀect performance
in the task, their impaired oculomotor function (Corin et al.,
1972; Shibasaki et al., 1979) may have also compromised patient
performance of the visuomotor task.
In light of the demands of the visuomotor task and to facilitate
compliance, patients were only tested whilst on their usual
dopaminergic medication. We did not measure their perception
of action ‘oﬀ ’ medication. Moreover, within each patient we did
not test across drug phases of their on–oﬀ cycle, i.e., in diﬀerent
times relative to levodopa administration. We could not therefore
dissociate the possible mechanisms through which dopamine
modulates Self priors in PD; and could not establish a causal eﬀect
of dopamine on Self priors as our results are correlational.
Conclusion
For the perception of one’s own goal-directed actions, the use
of exaggerated priors persists in PD. However, the dopaminergic
dose was negatively correlated with the degree of exaggeration of
priors, such that patients on more dopaminergic medication had
more accurate priors that closely represented the true distribution
of performance. This veridical perception is normally only
present for the observation of others’ actions. Our results
suggest that positive expectations can be increasingly impaired
in PD, especially with a relative dopaminergic overdose of
the ventral striatum and mesocortical systems. The resulting
changes in perception of action outcomes have implications
for understanding the normative mechanisms, and the risks of
aﬀective and behavioral symptoms in PD.
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